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THE LATIN AMERICA FREE TRADE AREA fLAFTAP

LAFT A was created in 1960 by Argentina, Brazil, Mexico,
Chile, Peru, Paraguay, and Uruguay through the Treaty of
Montevideo. 2 Columbia and Ecuador joined LAFT A in 1961.
Venezuela and Bolivia entered in 1966 and 1967, respectively.
LAFTA encompasses every Latin America Nation except Guyana,
Surinam, and Honduras.8
LAFTA attempted to create a free trade area whose principal
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mechanism for integration is an annual bilateral negotiation
system for trade concessions on an item-by-item basis. Under
LAFTA it was intended that membercstates eliminate duties and
other economic duties and other economic barriers on intra-area
movements of goods. The Montevideo Treaty set the annual rate
of tariff reduction at eight percent of the weighted average of
prevailing duties on imports for third-world countries.' There was
a provision for triennial negotiations of a common schedule, or list
of products, to be free from trade barriers, thus creating a free
trade zone. 5 All parties, however, would have had to agree on the
common schedule.6
The mechanisms for coordination were covenants between
equal partner countries rather than a supranational authority.
There were escape or "savings" clauses 7 for agricultural products
and for balance of payment situations. Under the "savings"
clauses each nation was given an opportunity to exercise a "public
policy" exception to be used for the protection of morality,
maintenance of security, and protection of national heritage. 8 Also,
restrictions on free trade areas might be allowed in cases where
untoward effects on the economy of a particular nation were produced.9
4. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 5. A more detailed explanation of the
calculations involved is found at Title I of Protocol No. 1.
5. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2 at art. 7, art. 8. See also Montevideo Treaty,
supra note 2 at Title VI of Protocolo No. 1.
6. URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA: TOWARD A
COMMON MARKET (1968).
7. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at Ch. VI, arts. 23-26, SAVINGS CLAUSE, Ch. VII,
art. 27-31, SPECIAL PROVISIONS CONCERNING AGRICULTURE.
8. Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 53. Article 53 provides:
No provision of the present Treaty shall be so construed as to constitute an impediment to the adoption and execution of measures to:
(a) The protection of public morality;
(b) The application of security laws and regulations;
(c) The control of imports or exports of arms, ammunition and other war equipment and, in exceptional circumstances, of all other military items, in so far
as this is compatible with the terms of article 51 and of the treaties on the
unrestricted freedom of transit in force among the Contracting Parties;
(d) The protection of human, animal and plant life and health;
(e) Imports and exports of gold and silver bullion;
(f) The protection of the nation's heritage of artistic, historical and archaeological value; and
(g) The export, use and consumption of nuclear materials, radioactive products
or any other material that may be used in the development or exploitation of
nuclear energy.
9. Wionczek, The Rise and the Decline of Latin American Economic Integration, IX
J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 49 (1973) (hereinafter cited as Wioncezk).
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LAFT A provided for special non-reciprocal trade concessions
(protection provisions) for less developed countries. Certain industries were accorded similar special non-discriminatory trade
protections. 10 There were also collective arrangements for financial and technical assistance. 11
The principle of reciprocity of benefits was adopted in the initial agreement. 12 In theory, each member nation would reciprocate with equal trade concessions. The theory of "complementarity," or prior agreement as to the location of production facilities,
recognizes that manufacturing tends to concentrate in countries
where there is a large national market and greater industrial
development. 13 Under complementarity, the member countries
agreed to a program of industrial allocation which would create a
"spread" effect rather than a "backwash effect." 1' Each participating country was theoretically assured of benefits through a
fair geographical allocation of new industries among the member
nations.
However, the Managua Treaty of December, 1960 abandoned
the principle of reciprocity .15 Priority was given to the formation
of a free trade area. Economic concessions became temporary in
nature and capable of being withdrawn whenever the domestic industry produced a surplus. This exacerbated LAFT A's problem
with the propensity of new manufacturing enterprises to locate in
more industrialized member countries. The abandonment of complementarity left the backwash tendencies unchecked. As a result,
indigenous forces rather than regional planning influenced the
location of new industrial activity.
10. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2 at Chapter VIII. art. 32(a)-(f) "MEASURES
IN FAVOR OF COUNTRIES AT A RELATIVELY LESS ADV AN CED STAGE OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT."
11. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 32(e).
12. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 8-13 (particularly Article 10).
13. See Wixom, supra note 1, at 314-315 regarding "complementarity," and at 304-305
regarding discussion of the problem of "center-periphery interaction" in the context of
LAFTA.
14. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 15-17 (generally). Article 16(b) provides:
" ... The Contracting Parties: ... (b) May negotiate mutual agreements on complementary
economies by industrial sectors."
15. The Managua Treaty, done December 13, 1960, T.I.A.S. No. 6543 (effective 1963).
The official Spanish-language text is at pp. 4-67; the English-language translation appears at
68-200 (even-numbered pages only); and the French-language translation appears at pp.
69-201 (odd-numbered pages only).
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In 1967, United States President Lyndon Johnson met with
Latin American heads of state at Punta del Este. They agreed
that 1985 would be the target date for converting LAFTA from a
free trade association into a common market. 11 Thereafter there
was a LAFTA meeting at Montevideo in 1968 to negotiate a second common list through the elimination of duties on wheat and
petroleum. However, after four months of negotiation there was
no agreement. 17
The Caracas Protocol in December, 196918 recognized that the
integration movement had slowed since the mid-1960's. The
Caracas Protocol was an effort by Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico
to postpone the deadline for complete tariff liberalization from
1973 to 1980. The Caracas Protocol in effect postponed the free
trade area for an additional seven years beyond the target date
set by the Montevideo Treaty. The proposal to convert LAFT A into a common market was delayed indefinitely. While the
Montevideo Treaty set annual rates of tariff reduction at 80/o of
the weighted average of prevailing duties on imports for thirdworld countries, 19 the Caracas Protocol reduced this to 2.90/o as of
1970.20
Many reasons have been advanced for LAFT A's lack of progress toward a common market. One reason is that LAFTA's
scope was too broad. 21 LAFTA put less developed nations in the
same category as intermediately developed nations and the "Big
Three." 22 Additionally, although Latin America looks like one
uniform piece of land on a map, it is divided by mountain ranges,
rivers, and extended distances. There is also a system of previous16. Simmonds, supra note 1, at 385.
17. Id., at 384.
18. Id., at 396.
19. The Montevideo Treaty, supra note 2, at art. 5.
20. Noted in Simmonds, supra note l, at 396.
21. BLASSA, DESARROLLO ECONOMICO y LA INTEGRACION (1965) [hereinafter cited as
Blassa].
22. I.e., Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. See A.L. Valdez, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: Analysis, 7 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 1 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Valdez]. This problem of "sub-regionalism" has caused serious problems. See Simmonds, supra note 19, at 396,
Agor & Suarez, supra note 19, at 159-160:
The disparate size and level of development among LAFTA members . .. [has]
been a constant obstacle to economic integration. The largest and most developed
countries-Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico-appear to have benefitted disproportionately from intrazonal trade, and they have been reluctant to grant concessions
to countries whose markets are "insufficient" . . . or "least developed . . .."
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ly established trade routes directed more toward traditional principal markets than toward neighboring nations. 23
Another problem arose from the original premise upon which
LAFT A was developed. The original theory propounded by Dr.
Raul Prebisch and others to justify Latin American integration
established the principle that planned national industrialization,
could not continue to stimulate the growth of import
substitution. 24 Greater levels of production were needed than
those which would satisfy local markets.
The lesser developed nations risked becoming markets for
the industrial surplus of the "Big Three." This market behavior is
not reciprocal, however, since the dependence of the "Big Three"
upon exports to the rest of LAFT A is not great enough for them
to grant commercial concessions to poorer neighbors.
It must be recognized that a free trade area is not a panacea. 25
It will not suddenly convert slow-growth economies into highly industrialized nations. Economic growth will be held back by social
factors such as a low literacy rate, poor health conditions, undernourishment, a trend toward urban migration, and a high birth
rate. 26 Add to these factors a high rate of inflation, an unequal
distribution of land, subsistence agriculture, and little technology
and the difficulties begin to increase geometrically.
IL

THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET
fCACMJ 21

The CACM was established by the General Treaty of Central
23. See Blassa, supra note 21.
24. Rose, Third World 'Commodity Power' Is a Costly Illusion, FORTUNE (Nov., 1976);
STRETEN & ALSON, DIVERSIFICATION AND DEVELOPMENT: THE CASE OF COFFEE (1971).
25. Blassa and Stoutjestijk, Economic Integration Among Developing Countries,
XIV, J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 37, 82 (1975),

Integration is not a panacea, however, by enlarging the market it can provide a
suitable framework for economic growth but the results will greatly depend on the
economic policies to be followed .... Increased investments are necessary which
will not be forthcoming if foreign investment is discouraged and domestic savings
are not generated. Also, changes in the social structure will often be called for ....
26. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 1, at 283.
27. Gordon, Developed, Developing and Dependent Nations: Central American
Development in a New Economic Realignment, 11 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1 (1976); [hereinafter
cited as Gordon]; URQUIDI, FREE TRADE AND ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN LATIN AMERICA:
TOWARD A COMMON MARKET (1968); WATKIN, TAXES AND TAX HARMONIZATION IN CENTRAL
AMERICA (1967) [hereinafter cited as Watkins]: Lizano and Willmore, SECOND
THOUGHTS ON CENTRAL AMERICA: THE ROSENTHAL REPORT, XIII J. COMM.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

5

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1980], Art. 5

188

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 7:183

American Economic Integration of 1961. 28 Guatemala, El Salvador,
Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua were signatories to the treaty.
The goal of the Central American Common Market for economic
development is to achieve intra-regional free trade of products
originating in Central America. Integration is a means of diversifying production, developing import substitutes, and compensating
for slow growth of exports. CACM also seeks to establish uniform
tariffs for products imported from outside Central America.
CACM has its roots in the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA), 29 which was organized in Santiago
in 1948. One constituent of the ECLA was the Committee on
Economic Cooperation for the Isthmus of Central America or
"Economic Cooperation Committee" (ECC). 30 In 1956 the ECC
published the Nomenclatura Arancelaria Uniforme Centroamericana81 which defined and classified all products subject to
customs duty. The Nomenclatura was adopted by all Central
American countries.
On October 14, 1951, Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Costa Rica (the Five Nations) signed the Charter
of San Salvador and formed a political union, the Organizacion de
Estados Centroamericanos (ODECA). 82 A new ODECA charter,
known as the Panama Charter, was signed on December 10, 1962.88
Panama did not sign this charter, but on June 17, 1966, it subscribMKT. STUD. 280 (1975); Schmitter, Central American Integration: Spil/,.Over, Spil/,.Around
of Encapsulation?, IX J. COMM. MKT. STUD. (1972).
28. Managua Treaty, supra note 150. The Treaty came into effect for El Salvador,
Guatemala and Nicaragua in June 1961, for Honduras in March 1962, and for Costa Rica in
November 1963; noted in Simmonds, supra note l, at 376.
29. K.R. Simmonds, The Central American Common Market: An Experiment in
Regional Integration, 16 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 911, 912 (1967).
30. Id. at 915.
31. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note 11, at 284. The Central American Agreement on the Equalization of Import Duties and Charges (1959) applied more than 97 percent
of the NUCA listings as the basis of that agreement.
32. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 914. "ODECA has been described as a regional
organization within a regional organization" because of development out of the OAS. Id.
ODECA was rocked in February 1969 by a bitter election for the position of
Secretary-General, an election which eventually was annulled. This occurred in the context
of hostilities between Honduras and El Salvador. Simmonds, supra note 1 at 395 (and n. 70
therein).
33. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 914. An English-language translation of the text of
the Charter appears at Appendice 22, pp. 480-486, in THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra
note 1.
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ed to some subsidiary non-economic integration organizations of
ODECA. 34
The Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American
Economic Integration (Multilateral Treaty)35 was signed June 10,
1958, by the Five Nations. The Multilateral Treaty set up an interim arrangement which established a free trade area for some
goods. It was accompanied by the Agreement on the Regime for
Central American Integration Industries and Treaty of Economic
Association (Integration Industries Convention). 36
The Integration Industries Convention had the goal of promoting industrial plants in an integrated context. The Convention
provided for subsidiary agencies, such as the Commission Centroamericano de lntegracion Industrial and the lnstituto Centroamericano de lnvestigacion y Tecnologia Industrial (ICAIT A). 37
The Convention also provided for a distribution of industries, but
however, such distribution was confined to enterprises requiring
access to the entire regional market. The convention did not apply
to Costa Rica. 38
The Central American Convention on the Equalization of Import Duties (Tariff Equalization Convention), which was signed by
the "Five Nations" on September 1, 1959,39 set up uniform regional
import duties for products originating outside of the Five Nation
area. The list of products originally totalled 270 products, but
later 200 more were added. Tariff equalization was to be achieved
through successive annual adjustments in national tariffs over
two, three, or five years.
The Treaty of Economic Association (the Tripartite Treaty)
was ratified on April 27, 1960, by El Salvador, Guatemala, and
Honduras, 40 Nicaragua was not invited to participate. The Tripar34. The Charter itself entered into force in 1~5. Provision for subsequent adherence
(in part or total) was contemplated in the "Transitional Provisions" subsequent to Article 30
of the Charter.
35. Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic Integration,
done June 10, 1958, T.I.A.S. No. 6539, (effective 1963), Simmonds, supra note 29, at 915.
36. Id. The 2 agreements were ratified by all the signatory nations excepting only
Costa Rica.
37. See, id., at 915, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note l, at 290.
38. Simmonds, supra note 29, at 915.
39. Central American Convention on the Equalization of Import Duties, done 1959,
T.I.A.S. No. 6542 (effective 1963).
40. Treaty of Economic Association, done 1960 (El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras),
383 U.NT.S., T.I.A.S. No. 5494 (effective 1961).
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tite Treaty tried a approach different from a gradual establishment of free trade. The Tripartite Treaty declared free of import
and export duties all products, labor, and capital originating in,
and traded among, the three member states, except for a limited
number of commodities on which duties would be gradually
removed. 41 The labor and capital applications were never put into
practice.42
The General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration (General Treaty) 43 which was signed in 1962 by the Five Nations took precedence over earlier instruments. Its goals were to
establish a common market and a customs union though no details
were given. 44 It accelerated the program for achieving free trade
by five years and extended immediate free trade among the Five
Nations by eliminating import and export duties on most intrazonal products with the exception of such important products as
coffee, sugar, wheat, flour, alcohol, distilled spirits, and
petroleum. 45
The Managua Protocol to the Tariff Equalization Convention
expanded the list of goods imported from outside of Central
America which were subject to uniform duties. 46 Later protocols
placed uniform duties on other imports from outside the zone.
Separate articles and other conventions established monetary
institutions. While the Banco Centroamericano de Integracion
41. Id., at art. III.
42. Treaty of Economic Association, supra note 59, at art. VI.
43. General Treaty of Central American Economic Integration, done 1962, 455
U.N.T.S. [hereinafter cited General Treaty]. The dates of signature and adherence, respectively, for the Five Nations to the "General Treaty" of CACM were:
El Salvador
Dec. 1960 and June 1961
Guatemala
Dec. 1960 and June 1961
Honduras
Dec. 1960 and April 1962
Nicaragua
Dec. 1960 and June 1961
Costa Rica
Dec. 1962 and Sept. 1963
The delay in Costa Rica's signature and adherence resulted from the 1962 election in that
country, causing major opponents of adherence to the Treaty to be "removed from political
power." Simmonds, supra note 29, 917.
44. General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. I. However, most of the Treaty's provisions
cover the free-trade area regime.
See Wixom, supra note 1, at 308 for a discussion of these terms in the general context, as well as that of "economic union." See also A. GOLBERT, Customs Union Theory v.
Practice, 4 Sw. U.L.R. 250 (1972).
45. General Treaty supra note 62, at art. III.
46. Managua Protocol to the Tariff Equalization Convention, done December 13, 1960.
454 U.N.T.S., T.I.A.S. No. 6542.
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Economica (BCIE) 47 was capitalized in U.S. dollars, the Central
America Clearing House Agreement adopted the peso centroamericano as a multilateral monetary base. 48 However, the peso
centroamericano is denominative to the U.S. dollar. Mexico joined
this system in 1963. Additionally, a uniform customs administration system was attempted through the Codigo Aduanero
Uniforme Centroamericano (CAUCA). 49
All of the above mentioned administrative institutions are
limited to Central America. The members of CACM are also
members of the · Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) 50
which was founded in 1969 by the United States and most Latin
American nations with the notable exception of Cuba. IADB has a
Fund for Special Operations which makes loans at local interest
rates, and the loans are repayable in local currencies. The United
States, Canada, Japan, eleven European nations, and twenty-two
Latin American and Caribbean nations are members at the present time.
The unequal distribution of benefits and industries created an
imbalance in regional development and trade such as in the problem of "final touch" industries 51 which are engaged in the bottling
or packaging of a product. CACM lacks strong centralized regional
institutions and there is no supranational enforcement agency.
The 1969 Soccer or Migration War 52 between El Salvador and
Honduras created serious consensus and cooperation problems
between the two nations. The issue in the conflict was free movement of largely illegal labor, mainly unemployed rural and urban
labor, from densely populated El Salvador to less populated Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Honduras implemented "land
reform" specifically directed at the squatters from El Salvador. In
July 1969, El Salvador attacked Honduras in retaliation. The attack stymied, but the war led to the suspension of trade in CACM
between the belligerents. 53 After the conflict Honduras put an embargo on transit from El Salvardor, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica,
47. General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. XVIII; noted in Simmonds, supra note 29, at
911. See also, THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, supra note l, at 290.
48. GRUNWALD AND SALAZAR-CARRILLO, ECONOMIC INTEGRATION: RATES OF EXCHANGE
AND VALUE COMPARISONS IN LATIN AMERICA, (1972).
49. As provided by General Treaty, supra note 43, at art. XXIX.
50. See Nambeil, Stronger Role Seen For the IDB, J. COM. (May 26, 1976).
51. See generally, Simmonds, supra note 19, at 379.
52. Watkins, supra note 27.
53. Id., at 395.
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and temporarily dropped out of CACM. 54 Protocols attempted to
work Honduras into the system by giving Honduras preferential
treatment.
The greater industrialization of Guatemala and El Salvador
led to Honduras and Nicaragua becoming markets for consumer
goods. Nicaragua accumulated a deficit within the Five Nation
zone, but was not able to increase intra-regional exports of its
primarily agricultural commodities. 55 In 1969, Nicaragua, in contravention of CACM agreements, introduced barriers to intraregional imports 56 which were lifted only after other members
ratified protoco'ls regarding equalization of fiscal incentives. Costa
Rica, because of financial problems, imposed tariff surcharges on
imports from extra-regional nations. 57 Costa Rica also established
a consumption tax on a list of regionally produced luxury goods.
This tax had adverse consequences for Guatemala.
Ill

THE ANDEAN PACT fANCOM) 58

In May of 1969, three years after the formation of LAFTA,
the five Andean western nations of South America (Bolivia, Chile,
Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru) signed the Cartegena Agreement, 59
and formed a customs union directed more toward the control of
foreign direct investment than toward free trade within the group
or harmonization of external tariffs. 60 Andean nations desired that
foreign interests neither gain control over the economy nor maintain current levels of participation. Bolivia and Ecuador were
54. Id.
55. BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET:
PROFITS AND PROBLEMS IN AN INTEGRATING ECONOMY [hereinafter cited as PROFITS AND PROBLEMS].
56. See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA (1968), 209 and (1969), 70.
57. PROFITS AND PROBLEMS, supra note 55. See also, Simmonds, supra note l, at 380
regarding these trade-deficit problems generally.
58. See BLUTH, THE ANDEAN PACT AND ITS MEMBER STATES-A STUDY IN CERTAIN FORMAL ASPECT OF SUBREGIONAL INTEGRATION, IN PRIVATE INVESTORS ABROAD: PROBLEMS AND
SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS IN 1975, 367 (1976); R. Tanino, The Andean Code
After Five Years, 8 LAW. AMERICAS 635 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Tanino]. D.
MORAWETZ, THE ANDEAN GROUP: A CASE STUDY IN ECONOMIC INTEGRATION AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1974) [hereinafter cited as Morawetz]; Abbott, Bargaining Power and

Strategy in the Foreign Investment Process: A Current Andean Code Analysis, 3 SYR. J.
INT'L L. & CoM. 319 (1976); Avery, Subregional Integration in Latin America: The Andean
Common Market, XI J. COMM. MKT. STUD. 85 (1973); Wionczek, supra note 27.
59. AGREEMENT OF CARTAGENA, done May 26, 1969, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'S 910
(1969) (effective Oct. 16, 1969).
60. Gordon, supra note 27.
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granted special treatment as less developed nations. 61 Venezuela
did not join the agreement at first because it objected to the
removal of protective barriers that shielded its industries and
feared that imports from other Andean nations, which have low
labor costs, would have an adverse effect on Venezuela's industry.
Venezuela later joined the Andean Pact. 62 In September, 1976,
Chile withdrew from ANCOM. 63
Objectives of the Cartegena Agreement included the promotion of development of member states, the acceleration of
economic growth rates, and the assurance of local benefits from a
common market. From a free market standpoint the Andean Pact
complemented LAFT A because AN COM was based on a concept
of facilitating participation of Andean nations in LAFTA. However, ANCOM went further than LAFTA in establishing harmonization and coordination conditions for converting the Andean
Pact into a customs union and a common market. 64
The Andean nations agreed to eliminate all tariffs among
themselves. 65 The Cartegena Agreement of 1969 provided for
automatic and irrevocable reduction of trade barriers by the end
of 1978, the erection of a common external or outer tariff as to
other nations, and the uniform treatment of foreign investment and
capital. 66 Members are committed to a non-negotiable reduction of
trade barriers as to all but a few products. 67 There are in theory no
negotiated tariff reductions as to specific products as in LAFT A.
Under the sectoral program, industrial development would be
allocated to individual countries. The program is a form of approved regional monopolies on the production of certain goods which
61. Special provisions regarding Bolivi.a and Ecuador are noted in E. Ereli, The Andean Common Market, 8 HOUSTON L. REV. 487, (1971).
62. For the reasons behind Venezuela's delay in joining ANCOM, see Ereli, supra
note 61, at 491; see also, 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'Ls 939 (1969) for the Protocol of Venezuela's
adherence to the Agreement.
63. See infra note 144 and the accompanying text.
64. MORAWETZ, supra note 58. Colombia exported goods worth U.S. $247.8 million to
other Andean nations in 1975; Peru was second with U.S. $130.1 million in sales; Gerardo
Zegers de Landa, EL PACTO ANDINO Y LA INDUSTRIA SUBREGIONAL DE
ARTEF ACTOS DE LA LINEA BLANCA 8 CUADEROS DE ECONOMIA 111 (1971).
65. It was agreed that this would be done in stages by listing all products into four
categories, to which different provisions would apply: (a) sectorial development; (b) common
list; (c) products not produced subregionally; and (d) nonscheduled products, Agreement of
Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 45. See also Ereli, supra note 61, at 492.
66. Agreement of Cartegena, supra note 59, at art. 26-27, 45, 61-68, and 89-90.
67. See Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 46.
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avoids the backwash effect of industrial coagulation which plagued
LAFTA and CACM. The sectoral development program is limited
to a complementarity type of agreement with respect to petrochemicals.
The Declaration of Bogota of August, 196668 expressed
dissatisfaction with LAFTA. The nations agreed that the costs of
laissez-faire treatment of private foreign capital were high and the
benefits derived therefrom were limited. The Mixed Commission
was established. 69 It prepared two documents, the Constitutive
Agreement of the Andean Development Corporation 70 (signed in
1968 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela)
and the Andean Subregional Integration Agreement 71 (The
Cartegena Agreement), signed in 1969 by Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru.
The Andean Pact has an administrative framework composed
of the Mixed Commission, the Junta, the Consultative Committee,
the Economic and Social Advisory Committee, and the Andean
Development Corporation. 72 The Mixed Commission is an intergovernmental body, a permanent diplomatic conference with one
representative from each member government which oversees the
"integrative process." 73 The Mixed Commission can act only with a
two-third majority vote with no negative votes. 74 The effect of this
procedure is to write a veto into the provisions of the Pact.
The Junta is like a board or a secretariat. It has three
members who are citizens of any Andean Latin American country.
The Junta makes technical decisions, and prepares plans. Any
decision of the Junta requires a unanimous vote.
Provision is also made for a liaison between the public and the
private sectors through bodies such as the Advisory Committee
and the Economic and Social Advisory Committee. 75 The Advisory
Committee consists of government representatives and advisors
68. Ereli, supra note 61, at 491. The Declaration of Bogota, as one of the motivating
factors leading to ANCOM, is noted in the Preamble to the Cartagana Agreement, supra
note 59.
69. Ereli, supra note 61, at 491.
70. Id. at 491.
71. See Agreement of Cartegena, supra note 59.
72. Tanino, supra note 58.
73. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 7.
74. See Ereli, supra note 61, at 492.
75. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 19-21.
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from the private sector. It acts as a liaison between the respective
national governments, the Junta, and the Mixed Commission. The
Economic and Social Advisory Committee is the successor body to
the Comite de Empresarios lndustriales del Grupo Andino, 76
which proposed the views of the private sector. The Advisory
Committee provides a forum for consultation with the private sector and is composed of three business representatives and three
labor representatives from each of the member countries.
The Corporation Andina Fomento, known as the Andean
Development Corporation, was formed in 1968. 77 Venezuela has
been a member from the Corporation's inception. The Corporation
is headquartered in Caracas with capitalization of 100 million U.S.
dollars. The purpose of the Corporation is to promote and finance
projects for Andean integration. It is both a lending institution
and a center for study and recommendation as to mechanisms for
coordination of credit and investment agencies.
The most important provisions of ANCOM regulate foreign
investment. Shortly after its formation, ANCOM created the
"Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital, and of
Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties," more commonly
known as Decision No. 24, or the ANCOM Foreign Investment
Code. 78 At the time of the treaty signing, American interests held
approximately 5 billion U.S. dollars of foreign owned investments
in the ANCOM nations. 79 Foreign owned or foreign controlled
enterprises are gradually required to divest majority ownership
and control over a 15- to 20-year period.18° In order to accomplish
76. See Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at art. 22 regarding the EconomicSocial Advisory Committee.
77. Ereli, supra note 61, at 495.
78. Adopted December 31, 1970 with subsequent amendments adopted on June 24,
1971, July 17, 1971, October 30, 1976, and November 30, 1979 via Decisions 37, 37a, 103, 109
and 110, respectively. The text of Decision 24 is reprinted in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 152
(1971). See also Valdez, supra note 22.
Article 27 of the Cartagena Agreement provides that "the Member Countries commit
themselves to adopt the provisions that may be necessary in order to put this system into
practice within six months following its approval by the Commission."
See also COUNCIL OF THE AMERICAS, ANDEAN PACT: DEFINITION, DESIGN AND ANALYSIS,
(1973); Zamora, Andean Common Market-Regu/,ations of Foreign Investment: Blueprint
for the Future, 10 INT'L LAW. 153 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Zamora]. Schliesser, Recent
Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Law, 7 INT'L LAW. 357 (1973) and 6
INT'L LAW. 64 (1972).
79. Lisocki, Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME LAW., 319 (1973).
80. Valdez, supra note 22, at 8.
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this nationalization of resources, the enterprises must register the
value of their capital investment. 81 The Treaty is not self-executing,
and it provides only the agreed upon minimum standards governing
continued or new foreign investment in the member states. 82
Stricter regulations, therefore, may be instituted in any member
state by means of appropriate national legislation. 83
The goal of Decision No. 24 is to transfer to local majority
ownership and majority control all foreign investment within a
member states's borders. The period of time within which this is
to be accomplished varies with the nation and with the type of industry involved. This underscores the link between the treatment
of foreign investment and the development goals of subregional integration.84 The incentive to participate in a wider free market will
theoretically outweigh the disincentives of regulation. Decision
No. 24 requires existing foreign investors to divest to minority
levels which may be enforced as a result of denied benefits of free
movement of goods and services within a common market. 85 Decision No. 24 regulates repatriation of capital (except liquidation
proceeds, defined as the value of the original investment plus additions, less net realized losses) and the remittance of profits
(generally not to exceed 20 percent per year of registered direct
81. Agreement of Cartagena, supra note 59, at _art. 5, 6; Valdez, supra note 22, at 8. See
also Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order as to Direct Foreign Investment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 771 (1972) regarding
discussion of the impact of the application of different treatment based upon the percentage
of foreign ownership.
82. Valdez, supra note 22, at 2. See also, Zamora, supra note 78, for a comparative
analysis showing great variations in the approaches of Chile and Venezuela (Decree No. 62)
and contrasting briefly the approaches of other countries. The disparity became so great
with the passage of Chile's Foreign Investment Statute, promulgated in 1974, that Chile
was specially requested to live up to its obligations under the Agreement Chile withdrew
from the Cartagena Agreement, with a few exceptions not related to foreign investment, by
Decision 102 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement on October 30, 1976. The
Chilean statute provides that foreign capital may be used for "activities productive of goods
or services of exceptional interest to the economic or social development of the country;"
that no discrimination will be permitted to the detriment of the foreign investment, its products or manner of operation. It provides for direct access to relief from such discrimination
if it is alleged and shown to exist, the failure of which relief gives recourse to the procedure
of compensation by judicial proceedings. See articles 1, 5, and 6, Decree Law dated July 13,
1974, as set forth at 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT LS 1176 (1974).
83. Generally, Ecuador's position as to foreign investment is as liberal as possible
within the limitations of Decision 24. A. ANDERSON, TAX AND TRADE GUIDE 25 (1976).
84. Oliver, supra note 81, at 780.
85. Oliver, supra note 81, at 777.
1
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foreign investment). 86 The Decision also reserves to national
ownership certain key investment sectors, including utilities,
media, and the financial and transportation industries. 87
Enforcement is provided through the requirement that all
new direct foreign investment and all contracts and transfers of
foreigners for investment be submitted to and approved by an appropriate national body .88 Freedom of contract with respect to intellectual property is thereby limited. 89 The use of such property
cannot be tied to a sale of raw materials, and the foreign investor
must limit exports of products manufactured under a license. 90 The
Investment Code makes illegal any payments of royalties to a
foreign investor for the use of "intangible technology," which is
not defined, but may include know-how. 91
The Investment Code places restrictions on foreign investors'
access to local credit. 92 Contracts for external credit must be authorized and registered by local authorities and the amount of interest paid on an intra-company loan between a foreign parent and
an Andean subsidiary cannot be more than three percent above
the going rate of interest on first-class loans in the country from
which the loan is made. 93 Foreign enterprise is denied access to
other than short-term local credit. 94
Concessions to foreign companies are allowed regarding
resources until 1981 95 but not as to depletion allowances. Any such
concessions are limited to a twenty-year maximum time period. 96
Establishment of new foreign-owned companies is prohibited in
the sectors of public services, insurance, banking, and finance. 97
Prohibited sectors include radio, television, newspapers, and in86. Id., at 779-780; Valdez, supra note 22 at 11.
87. Valdez, supra note 22, at 11; Oliver, supra note 81.
88. Articles 2 through 4 of the Investment Code as noted in Oliver, supra note 81, at
772.
89. Valdez, supra note 22, at 10.
90. Lisocki, supra note 79, at 320-323, 324.
91. A. Alessandri, The Andean Approach to the Transfer of Technology 67-68 (May,
1975) (unpublished manuscript).
92. Lisocki, supra note 79, at 320.
93. See Valdez, supra note 22, at art. 40.
94. Id., at 13.
95. See Valdez, supra note 22, at art. 40.
96. Id. See also Lisocki, supra note 79, at 324; Oliver, supra note 81, at 775.
97. Foreign Firms Get Cold Shoulder From Proposed ANCOM Investment Regulations, BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA 353, 354 (Nov. 5, 1970) [hereinafter cited as Foreign Firmsj.
See generally S. Fouts, The Andean Foreign Investment Code, 10 TEX. INT'L L. J. 537
(1975).
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ternal transportation in domestic markets. 98 Foreign banking institutions must sell eighty-percent of their capital to domestic (Andean) sources within three years in order to continue receiving
local deposits. 99
The Investment Code prohibits agreement clauses that oust
the host nation from jurisdiction over investment disputes. 100 It
similarly prohibits subrogation of foreign states to rights of national investors in investment disputes. 101 Thus, the benefits of the
U.S. Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) are unobtainable in Andean nations because OPIC must succeed to the
rights of a national investor after payment of a claim in order to
permit diplomatic intervention. 102
It is unclear whether the Code clashes with the supposed
minimum international standard of treatment of foreign property.
The paramount question is whether the Code provides for compensation if the foreign investor, through no fault of its own, is unable
to find an acceptable buyer for its majority interest. 103 Furthermore, the Code does not specifically take into account earnings retained because of repatriation and reinvestment limitations. The
limit of permitted reinvestment is generally five to seven percent
of profits per year. 104 In the case of limbo capital, an orderly sale of
98. Note Venezuela's designation of restricted investment sectors. See Zamora, supra
note 78. The Venezuelan Regulations are published in Gaceta Oficial de la Republica de
Venezuela, Nos. 1,620 and 1,650 (Nov. 1. 1973 and April 29, 1974, respectively) as noted in
the Zamora article.
99. Foreign Firms, supra note 97, at 354; see also, Fouts, supra note 97.
100. MORA WETZ, supra note 58.
101. See Article 51 of the Investment Code as discussed in Valdez, supra note 22, at 15.
102. As an initial result of Article 51's adoption, OPIC operations in the Andean nations were suspended in 1972. See the Address by OPIC's President, Bradford Mills, at
Johns Hopkins University (March 16, 1972); noted in Valdez, supra note 22, at 15. As Valdez
points out, the impact of the Calvo Clause philosophy may have been behind the intent of
Article 51.
OPIC's authorization is codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200a. Congress, in the 1978
Amendments to OPIC, observed that, "After OPIC pays a claim and thereby becomes the
legal claimant it may negotiate directly with the host government for settlement." H. Rep.
No. 95-670, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1977), reprinted in (1978) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
618.
103. Valdez, supra note 22, at 9, 17 regarding Articles 3(c) and 35.
104. With the clarification of the definition of direct foreign investment (to include
"reinvestments made in conformity with the Regime, along with the right of
resources in national currency to be remitted abroad), if automatic reinvestments
up to the 7 percent are honored, and investments above such percentage are
authorized, then the ... frozen fund problem will disappear."
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ownership overage to a governmental or private market is envisaged as well as an increased authorization for reinvestment
that does not upset the majority control or ownership. 105 With
respect to limbo cash, the corporation presumably must retain
these excess earnings in trust for the direct foreign investor until
a time when they can permissibly be distributed to the alien. If the
excess earnings are not held in trust, the question of "creeping expropriation" arises with respect to uncompensated earnings. 106
The question then arises whether the state has any responsibility
to insure adequate compensation to the alien investor for the required divestment of its majority ownership and rights of
repatriation. The alien investor's dilemma is the choice between
divestment at a loss (if no buyers can be found at a suitable price)
or staying in business at a loss (in the face of the competitors' advantage of access to the common market).
A problem exists not only as to whether the Code effects actual expropriation, but whether the expropriation is legal as well.
The Code simply provides that member countries shall not grant
to foreign investors any treatment more favorable than that
granted to national investors, thus, the Code inferentially negates
the idea of any substantive minimum international standard. 107

s. ROSE, THE ANDEAN PACT: DECISION 24 REVISED AS CHILE LEAVES 5 (1976) [hereinafter
cited as RosE]. These same comments apply to the increases in the profit repatriation limits.
Both the reinvestment and profit remittance limit increases will be illusory unless the
foreign investors are permitted to establish reasonable direct foreign investment bases
either through reinvestments in their own companies or new investments in other sectors
or in companies in their same sector.
105. Upon authorization by the competent national agency, the owners of a direct
foreign investment shall have the right to transfer abroad, in freely convertible
currency, the verified net profits resulting from their direct foreign investment,
up to 20 percent thereof per year.
However, each Member Country may authorize higher percentages, reporting
to the Commission the provisions or determinations taken in this respect.
The competent national agency may also authorize the investment of surplus
distributed profits, in which case the latter shall be considered to be direct foreign
.investment.
ROSE, supra note 104.
106. Due to the importance placed upon the ultimate divestiture of the investment to
local interests, there is only one possible legal vehicle to avoid divestiture under the Investment Code. This is Decision 47 of ANCOM applicable to any member state having ratified
it. Under Decision 47, the foreign investor is allowed to maintain up to a seventy percent interest in the local investment in order to avoid divestiture. However, the benefits under
this decision are granted solely on a case by case basis by the local government.
107. Regarding the "minimum international standards" concept and "state responsibility," Castel observes:
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Thus, the Code presumably prohibits granting any transfer of
direct foreign investment under terms restricting a foreign investor to a lesser degree than in the case of a national in similar
circumstances.
The question becomes what standard will apply for the protection of foreign owned property. As the Code by definition acts
on the interests of foreign investors only, then if an alien claims
that the Code effectively confiscates its investment without compensation, the contention that the alien is only entitled to the
treatment accorded to nationals will work against the ANCOM
member. 108 No nationals are therefore affected by the law. The
right and duty of the alien's government, under customary international law, to protect its nationals, must be re-examined. The
principle of just compensation should compel the alien's government to demand that the recipient country permitting the alien's
The standard of conduct which a State is expected to pursue in its dealings
with aliens has been the subject of considerable controversy. The Latin American
States, against which large numbers of international claims have been presented,
have often maintained that no violation of international law is committed so long
as there is no discrimination against the alien. It is thus a perfect defense to a
claim, according to this view, to assert that nationals· of the respondent State are
treated in the same fashion as was the alien. International tribunals have generally
taken the view that, although a State must as a minimum not discriminate against
aliens, its conduct must ultimately be judged by international standards, and that
a State may not be heard in its defense to allege that its nationals are treated in
exactly the same way as aliens. It may be said in defense of the position of the
Latin American States that there may be some reason to apply local standards in
the case of a natural or juristic person maintaining a permanent residence in a
given State. Under such circumstances, the argument might run, the individual or
corporation must be considered to have assumed the risk of residence in that country .... But when we turn from the protection of property to the protection of the
person and of fundamental rights of the individual, it is difficult to maintain that
the alien should have no protection under international law because all nationals of
the country concerned are subjected to the same injustices. The international
responsibility of States is a vast, complex, and ill-defined subject. It involves more
than the responsibility of a State for injuries to the property or person of aliens.
J. CASTEL, INTERNATIONAL LAW: CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN CANADA 1070
(1976).
Oliver, supra note 81, at 768 makes this point:
Article 50, in a sense, approaches the "equality of treatment" viewpoint by the
back door, providing that:
"Member countries shall not grant to foreign investors any treatment
more favorable than that granted to national investors."
Foreign investors are not guaranteed national treatment. Under Article 50 they
cannot have more than national treatment, which seems inferentially to negate the
notion of a substantive international minimum standard.
108. Oliver, supra note 81, at 784.
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entry recognize its obligation under international law to afford an
alien protection both for human and property rights. In reality,
equality of treatment may be logically consistent with a definition
of the alien's rights which hold the state liable for violation of the
rights of its own nationals as well as those of aliens. 109 Yet, disagreement still persists as to exactly what such rights would entail.
The European Economic Commission controls over direct
foreign investment appear to have a different tenor from ANCOM.110 ANCOM permits subregional investors (investors of one
of the member nations) to make the same investments as a nation,
subject to certain reporting requirements and product
limitations. 111 ANCOM ownership limitations, however, will prevent any majority foreign-owned interest from l;>ecoming a national investor in any member state. The ECC envisions not only
the free flow of capital, goods, and services between member
states, but also specifically extends the right of establishment 112 to
109. W. BISHOP, INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS, 744-45 (1971) citing 5
HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 471 (1943).
If the alien receives the benefits of the same laws, protection, and means of
redress for injuries which the state accords to its own nationals, there is no
justifiable ground for complaint unless it be shown that the system of law or its administration falls below the standard generally recognized as essential by the community of nations.
When the treatment accorded an alien falls below the standard required by international law, the receiving state is culpable of violating an international legal
interest of the state of which the alien is a national.
See also W. Bishop, supra at 752:
In his capacity as Special Reporter on State Responsibility for the International
Law Commission, Garcia Anador of Cuba proposed that the standard should be
that of equality with nationals, provided this should not be less than the international standard of 'human rights' and fundamental freedoms ....
For the purpose of the application of the provision of this draft, aliens enjoy
the same rights and the same legal guarantees as nationals, but these rights and
guarantees shall in no case be less than the "human rights and fundamental
freedoms" recognized and defined in contemporary international instruments.
110. It is suggested that the increase of U.S. investment in the EEC may be due in fact
to economic integration. L. KRAUSE, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT, EEC INTEGRATION AND
THE U .8. (1968).
111. As per Article 30, the general policy attitude toward "sub-regional" affairs is
stated in §§ 1-3 and 5-6 of the preliminary declaration.
112. See J. LANG, FREEDOM OF ESTABLISHMENT IN THE EEC, THE COMMON MARKET AND
COMMON LAW 139 (1966); A. CAMPBELL AND D. THOMPSON, COMMON MARKET LAW. 47 (1962).
Article 67 of the Rome Treaty provides:
Member states shall, in the course of the transitional period and to the extent
necessary for the proper functioning of the Common Market, progressively abolish
as between themselves restrictions on the movement of capital belonging to per-
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a national of a member state which has its registered office, central management, or main establishment within the community.
No further investigation into the ties between the national and its
member state is required, and the corporate law of the member
state is dispositive beyond the specified requirements. Thus, if no
foreign ownership limitations exist in a member state, the access
of foreigners to the free market is uninhibited on the grounds of
residence.
A savings clause, "in the event of movements of capital
leading to disturbances in the functioning of the capital market," 113
allows the Commission to authorize particular protective
measures. Significant limitations on harmful acts by foreign investors are also contained in the anti-trust provisions (Articles 85
and 86) of the EEC. 114 But the EEC provisions, with their substantially different orientations towards direct foreign investment and
illicit market activities, provide no justification for the ANCOM
approach which, without true flexibility in administration, clearly
raises expropriation issues, if only in a more organized fashion
than other expropriative acts in Latin American economic history.
Decisions 84 and 86 of the Andean Commission provide for
the creation of a regional technological infrastructure and for the
treatment of patents, licenses, and trademarks. 115 The goal in the
technological area is to acquire necessary but inexpensive foreign
technology with few strings attached and to simultaneously build
up local research and development capabilities. The policy is to
prevent a form of double profit from technological transfer. Ansons resident in Member States and also any discriminatory treatment based on
the nationality or place of residence of the parties or on the place in which such
capital is invested.
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 5
(No. 4301). See also Nottebohn Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) [1955] I.C.J. 4, for the
"minimum contacts" test under international law.
113. The Rome Treaty, supra note 112, at art. 73.
114. See 2 H. SMIT. & P. HERZOG, THE LAW OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY: A
COMMENTARY,§ 85.06 (1976), regarding "incompatible" business practices in the EEC, and§§
86.13-86.20 regarding "abuse" of market position in the EEC. See also Joelson & Griffin, /11r
ternational Regulation of Restrictive Business Practices Engaged in by Transnational
Enterprises: A Prognosis, 11 INT'L LAW. 5, (1977) regarding Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty
of Rome, and id. at 14 regarding the OECD's 1976 GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES.
115. Promulgated at the Thirteenth Period of the Extraordinary Sessions of the Commission (May 27-June 5, 1974, at Lima, Peru), 13 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1478, 1489 (1974). Note
that patents, licenses and trademarks were previously regulated by Articles 18-21 and 24-26
of Decision 24.
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dean nations see foreign investors profiting once from technology
as a fixed cost of the initial sale of a product and then profiting
again from the foreign parent company sale of technology to the
Andean subsidiary. Therefore, technological agreements may not
be capitalized as direct foreign investments. 116 Parent companies
cannot receive royalty payments from subsidiaries incorporated in
ANCOM for use of patents, trademarks, or licenses. 117 More importantly, parent companies cannot receive payments for the technical assistance of trained personnel.
Article 44 of Decision 24 states in part, "When, in the opinion
of the recipient country, special circumstances exist, that country
may apply other regulations than those provided in Articles 40 to
43, inclusive (prohibiting enterprises in public services, banking,
insurance, media, and transportation)." 118
Some observers hoped that Article 24 would provide a savings clause for the internal conflict over ANCOM's foreign investment restrictions. In an attempt to keep Chile in the Andean Pact,
Decision 100, predicated on the powers of Article 44, was drafted
to modify some of the foreign investment restrictions. 119 However,
this decision again provided too little. Chile not only desired an
easing of the restrictions with respect to foreign investment in
Decision 24 but also opposed all limits on profit remittances
because "such limits scare off foreign capital." 120 Instead, Chile
favored unrestricted foreign investment and low tariff barriers.
During negotiations, sources indicated that the other five countries agreed to a reduction of the common external tariff to 26 percent while Chile held out for a 12 percent maximum. 121 Chile maintained that the value of indigenous manufacturers and not the
116. See supra at note 78, Decision, 24, art. 21. Note also that the Andean nations,
through the Andean Development Corporation, pledged themselves to promote sel
COMMENTARY§ 85.06 (1976), regarding "incompatible" business practices in the EEC, and§§
117. Id. at art. 21.
118. Ecuador and Peru in 1971 also took advantage of Article 44's "option" to apply
special regulations to certain industries, Perenzin, Multi-National Companies Under the
Andean Pact-A Sweetner for Foreign Investors?, 7 INT'L LAW. 396, 397 (1973).
119. For a review and analysis of the impact of Chile's decision to leave ANCOM
because of the dispute concerning Decision 100, see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, CHILEAN
DISSENSION TO HAVE MINIMAL EFFECTS ON ANCQM TRADE PROSPECTS, 257 (1976); CHILE AND
ANCOM: WHAT ARE THE ISSUES AND WHAT CAN RESULT, 29 (1976); CHILE'S TIES TO ANCOM
CONTINUE STRONG THROUGH CAF (CORPORACION ANDINO DE FOMENTO) AND ANDEAN MNC'S.
120. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 35 (1976).
121. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 37 (1976).
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ownership of shares should determine the nationality of companies, and that the external tariff should not give excessive protection to local industries. Colombia agreed with Chile, while
Ecuador and Venezuela held a hard line. Thus, Chile refused to
sign Decision 100, the protocol modifying the Cartagena Agreement, and announced its retirement from the Andean Pact. 122
In the latest modifications to Decision 24, Decision 109123
declared agriculture a basic activity for Ecuador and Bolivia,
thereby exempting foreign investments in this field from the provisions of Decision 24. 124 Individual foreign residents in member
countries will now be allowed to remit profits and repatriate
capital from investments by using locally generated funds. 125
Capital from international lending agencies and economic cooperation agencies is considered neutral and exempt from the fade-out
requirements of Decision 24. 126 The Commission has also raised the
limit on profit remittances by foreign companies from 14 percent
to 20 percent. 121 In earlier negotiations with Chile, the five countries remaining in ANCOM had offered to allow foreign companies
to increase the annual reinvestment of profits from 5 percent to 7
percent. 128
ANCOM still has some internal strains over the question of
restrictions on foreign investment. Bolivia, like Chile, was drawn
into the economic orbit of the "southern cone" and signed certain
riew economic agreements with Argentina. 129 Peru and Chile
122. See Chile Withdraws from the Andean Group, 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1446 (1976);
Latin American Economic Integration: Chile Withdraws from Andean Pact, 9 LAW. OF THE
AMERICAS 179 (1977).
123. The modifications brought about by Decision 109 (Nov. 30, 1976) are integrated, in
an English-language translation, with those of Decisions 37 (June 24, 1971), 37-A (July 17,
1971), 70 (Feb. 13, 1973), and 103 (Oct. 30, 1976) to the codified text of Decision 24; See, 16
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977).
124. Id. at art. 40, para. 2.
125. Id. at art. 7. See also, Article 6(d) regarding the ability to repatriate funds in "freely convertible currency."
126. v LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 3, (1977); Andean Bloc Eases Investment
Curbs, Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1976, at 6.
127. IV LATIN AMERICA ECONOMIC REPORT 33, (1976) [hereinafter cited as REP. No. 33);
id. at 12.
128. Id.
129. See BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, Argentine-Bolivian Accord Offers Opportunities on
Several Levels 318 (1976). The Agreement covers trade, agriculture, transportation and industrialization. Earlier in 1976, an agreement was reached in which Bolivia obtained a "free
zone" at the Argentinian port of Rosario, while Bolivia agreed to increase the sale of natural
gas to Argentina. Among other major projects, a $10 million petrochemical plant to jointly

https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol7/iss2/5

22

Golbert and Gingold: Latin American Economic Integration

1979-80]

Latin American Economic Integration

205

welcome foreign investment, and Peru is increasing its emphasis
on private enterprise. Apparently restrictions and controls on
foreign investment are diminishing.
Two recent ANCOM developments should be noted. In 1976,
the five remaining nations agreed to create an Andean Reserve
Fund. 130 The purpose of the Fund is to "provide balance of
payments support for the member countries ... [through a] ...
joint administration of a fund formed from part of the international monetary reserves of the member countries ... [and] ...
orienting [these] financial resources toward placements which contribute to the development of commerce in the subregion...." 131
The Reserve Fund Agreement, which entered into force in
1978,132 was provided with $240 million as capital,133 and -is run by
an Assembly, a Board of Directors, and an Executive Presidency .134
The Reserve Fund may undertake both debt and credit operations
in furtherance of the goals of the treaty. 135
In 1977, the AN COM member-states agreed to create a Court
of Justice within the Cartagena Agreement. 136 The purpose of the
Court is
to guarantee the strict fulfillment of the commitments directly
and indirectly deriving from the Cartagena Agreement . . .
[because it is essential that] ... both the stability of the Cartagena Agreement and the rights and obligations deriving from
it must be safe-guarded by a juridical entity at the highest level,
independent of the governments of the member countries and
from the other bodies of the Cartagena Agreement, with the
authority to define communitarian law, resolve the controversies
which arise under it, and to interpret it uniformly. 137

The Court, which is intended to sit in quito when constituted, will
have five justices serving six-year terms and elected at three-year
produce pesticides, already under construction, was speeded up in its construction schedule
(under the authority of both States' petroleum entity).
130. See Andean Group: Treaty for the Creation of the Andean Reserve Fund, 17 INT'L
LEGAL MAT'LS 1191 (1979).
131. Id. at 1191.
132. Id. at 1191.
133. Id. at art 5.
134. Id. at art. 13.
135. Id. at arts. 8, 9.
136. See Andean Group: Treaty Creating the Court of Justice of the Cartagena Agreement, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1203 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Court of Justice Treaty].
137. Id. at 1203.

Published by SURFACE, 1980

23

Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 7, No. 2 [1980], Art. 5

206

Syr. J. Int'l L. & Com.

[Vol. 7:183

rotating intervals. Provision was also made for the creation of the
position of Attorney General subject to ANCOM agreement at a
later date. 138 The Court would have the power to consider acts of
nullification and acts of noncompliance and to issue advisory opinions to the ANCOM Commission. 139
The preceding measures operate on theories having little
relevance to many of the exigencies of developing countries in the
modern world. Tariff barriers and quantitative restrictions do not
address the issue of what development must take place in order
for a less developed nation, or group of nations, to participate in
the global economic system. Such measures miss the point because
they provide too little.
At a time when the major economic problem facing Latin
America is the shortage of capital,1'0 the ANCOM nations and certain other Latin American countries have imposed restrictions
upon investment of foreign capital in their nations. An alternative
course of action would be to liberalize licensing and business formation requirements for foreign business and to offer incentives
to foreign investors. The integrating nations, however, have been
anxious about the ability of multinational or large foreign firms to
maximize profits at the expense of those nations. 141 This fear was
especially felt in commodities for which correct transfer prices
were difficult to establish. The correct transfer price is the price
at which the commodity should be transferred to the related subsidiaries of the investing multinationals in another country.
Transfers of the benefits of technological advances in the form of
138. Court of Justice Treaty, supra note 136, at art. 6; id. at art. 7, para. 1, 3; id. at art.

9.
139. Court of Justice Treaty, supra note 136, at ch. Ill; id. at arts. 17-22, 23-27, 28-31.
140. What's in the Future? New Approaches to New Realities, WORLDWIDE P&I PLANNING 1 (Jan.-Feb. 1972); Cahn, The Potential Exposure Problem: An Overlooked Invesetment Decision, WORLDWIDE P&I PLANNING, (May-June 1972); Hendershott, THE CAPITAL
SHORTAGE: HERE TODAY, GONE TOMORROW, 28 U. MICH. Bus. REv. 1 (1976) ("insuffient growth in the capital stock since 1969"); Latin American Economic Growth, 44 MEX.
AM. REV. 31 (1976); Economic Outlook for Latin America, 44 MEX. AM. REV. 30 (1976);
Higson, Latin-U.S. Trade- A Bicentennial Appraisal, 44 MEX. AM. REV. 24 (1976); Juttner,
Legal Safeguards for Direct Investment in LDCs, 9 INTER ECON. 259 (1976); Ereli, Private
Investment Aspect of the Andean Common Market, XIV J. COM. MKT. STUD. 333 (1975); The
IMF Wields Sudden New Power, Bus. WEEK, March 28, 1977 at 86; Stoneman, Foreign
Capital and Economic Growth, 3 WORLD DEV. 11 (1975).
141. Hague, Integration, Worldwide, Regional and Sectorial, 9 J. WORLD TRADE L. 103
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Hague]; MORAN, MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND THE POLITICS
OF DEPENDENCE (197 4).
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royalties and salaries to key personnel were at the heart of the
abuses by the companies. m

IV.

THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM (SELA)

Following the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations
General Assembly during which the Declaration and Program of
Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Rights and Duties of States was adopted, 143 twenty-five Latin
American nations meeting at Panama City in 1975 adopted a convention creating the Sistema Economica Latinamericano
(SELA). 1" SELA is intended to be, "a permanent regional body for
consultation, coordination, cooperation and joint economic and
social promotion ...." 145 In addition to the promotion of these activities within the hemisphere, SELA is intended "to provide a
permanent system of consultation and coordination for the adoption of common positions and strategies on economic and social
matters in international bodies and forums as well as before third
countries and groups of countries." 146 A lengthy list of more
specific objectives covers Latin American-based multinational corporations, agriculture, processing of raw materials for export,
commodity price supports, acquisition of capital and high-level
technology, regional financial growth, exchange of technological,
scientific, educational, and cultural information, transportation
and communications development, tourist growth and environmental protection, and emergency assistance to member
states. 147 Other integration efforts are also promoted. 148
142. Note that some of the "abuses" involving payment of compensation to alienexecutives of multinational corporations resident in the "host" countries have actually been
"encouraged" by the laws regarding taxation of, as well as the transfer and termination of,
executive personnel. This practice is often in sharp contrast to practices under American
law. See E. KOLDE, THE MULTINATIONAL COMPANY: BEHAVIORAL AND MANAGERIAL ANALYSIS
176 (1974).
143. Text of resolutions along with reservations of five industrial nations (the United
States, West Germany, France, Japan and the United Kingdom) as well as the draft resolutions referred to ECOSOC reprinted in 13 INT"L LEGAL MAT'LS 715 (1974).
144. See Latin American States: Convention Establishing the Latin AmericanEconomic System (SELA), 15 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS, 1081 (1976) [hereinafter cited as SELA/.
The twenty-five signatories were Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazi~ Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemaf,a,
Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad
and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuef,a, id. at 1081.
145. Id. at art. 2.
146. Id. at art. 3(b).
147. Id. at art. 5(1).
148. Id. at art. 5(2-5).
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SELA is governed by a Latin American Council, various Action Committees, and a Permanent Secretariat 1' 9 whose powers
and duties are fully detailed. 160 Within the first nine months after
the adoption of the Convention, fifteen of the twenty-five states
had ratified the Convention and had become member states of
SELA. 151
One of the concerns with the establishment of SELA has been
that SELA would either replace other regional agencies or
weaken them, presumably because of duplicative efforts. 152
Venezuelan President Carlos Perez saw SELA as beneficial
because it would free "itself from the more inflexible structures of
traditional movements [which would] contribute[s] to more
dynamic, more human and much more effective integration." 153 In
addition, SELA would be useful because it "will serve to
demonstrate that our nationalism is not to be governed by the law
of the strongest." 154 Not all observers agree with the lack of concern over the duplication of efforts. While there have been
"dozens of declarations and agreements ... towards this objective
(i.e., economic integration) ... there is no justification for the unnecessary duplication of activities of organs such as SELA and
CECLA." 155
One interesting area that SELA has been pursuing is the
development of Latin American based multinational corporations
whose goals would not be limited to "the maximization of profit
and the more intensive use of capital and technology ," 156 but would
be more oriented toward "the basic necessities of the peoples of

149. Id. at art. 8.
150. Id. at arts. 9-19, 20-26, 27-31 (respectively).
151. Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador,
Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela
were included. See SELA supra note 61, at 1081.
152. See Lorts & Schmitz, Latin American Economic Integration, 9 LAW. AMERICAS
651, 655 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Lorts & Schmitz].
153. Comercio Exterior de Mexico, 188; (May 1977), reprinted in Lorts & Schmitz,
supra note 152.
154. Id. The United States is not a signatory to the convention, nor a member of
SELA.
155. VaTgas-Hidalgo, Economic Integration, Development P/,anning and Sovereignty:
A Latin American View, 9 LAW. AMERICAS 318, 321 (1977).
156. Remarks of Jamie Moncayo, Permanent Secretary of SELA, in Comercio Exterior
de Mexico, 451(No.1977) reprinted in Lott, Latin American Ec~nomic Integration, 10 LAW.
AMERICAS 549, 561 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Lott].
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Latin America." 157 A major area of effort by SELA has been in the
agriculture-nutrition sector. 158 In 1977, SELA member-states announced ther intention to organize several Latin American
multinational corporations who would devote their activities to
the agriculture effort. 159 One of the first activities is designed to increase fertilizer production thereby elminating the region's heavy
dependence upon imported fertilizers or fertilizer raw material. 160
Another major effort is that of organizing a Latin American
network for technological information (Red de Informacion Tecnologica (RITLA), which is designed to "reduce the area's reliance
upon technology brought in by transnational corporations." 161 By
the fall of 1978, consultation efforts among member state governments had begun on this project. 162 SELA is also becoming involved in a number of international forums in order to provide a more
powerful voice of its views. 163 Efforts in 1978 and 1979 included
participation in UNCT AD, the International Monetary Fund, and
the North-South dialogue. 164
V.

THE TREATY FOR AMAZONIAN COOPERATION

One of the more recent regional efforts came about with the
1978 signing of the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, 165 by the
eight nations who share the river basin of the Amazon. 166 The purpose of the treaty is "to promote the harmonious development of
the Amazon region ... to raise the standard of living of their peoples
... so as to achieve total incorproation of their Amazonian territories into their respective national economies . . . ." 167 This
general cooperative effort is to be coordinated by an Amazonian
157. Id.
158. Id. at 562-63.
159. See R. Benitez, Inter-American Legal Developments, 9 LAW. AMERICAS 340, 370
(1977).
160. See L. Fernandez, Latin American Economic Integration, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 151,
158 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Fernandez].
161. See Lott, supra note 156, at 1008.
162. See Fernandez, supra note 160, at 158-159.
163. See S. Rose, Latin American Economic Integration, 11 LAW. AMERICAS 521, 525
(1979) [hereinafter cited as Rose].
164. Id.
165. See Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation, July 3, 1978, 17 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 1045
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Amazonian Treaty].
166. Id. The eight nations are Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru,
Surinam, and Venezuela.
167. Amazonian Treaty, supra note 165, at 1045.
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Cooperation Council compromised of "top level diplomatic Representatives" of the parties to the treaty as well as a Secretariat. 168
The regional effort was intended to begin "on a relatively
small scale, limited initially to the development of joint activities
in such areas as hydrology, viability studies relating to economic
projects, irrigation, reforestation, agricultural exploration,
livestock production, fishing, road building, combined river,
highway and railroad transport systems, social welfare projects
and medical care." 169 The potential development of the Amazon
region is enormous because it is the "largest and richest basin in
the world." 110 Unfortunately, since the signing of the treaty, there
has been almost no progress in the region. 171 Indeed, there is some
evidence to sugges.t that development and rational planning in the
basin have actually retrogressed as evidenced by the rapacious activities of large corporations in land clearing operations and
bureaucratic mismanagement of ecological concerns in the
Brazilian portion of the basin. The result could be "disastrous consequences to the region, as brush invasion and soil erosion take
over what was once a fertile area." 172
One of the problems is that there is some suspicion among
Brazil's neighbors that Brazil's strong effort to promote the Treaty for Amazonian Cooperation 173 involved more than an interest in
the development of the river basin. Others suspect that Brazil, not
a member of ANCOM, would like to use the Amazonian Pact as a
means of obtaining a voice in greater regional policies in order to
expand its influence in the Pacific and Caribbean. 174 A number of
statements by Ecuadorian, Venezuelan, and Brazilian officials in
1977 and 1978 lend credence to these suspicions. 175
168. Id. at arts. XXI, XXII.
169. See Lott, supra note 156, at 569. The background of the meetings which led to the
Pact is also discussed id. at 569.
170. Id. at 569.
171. See Rose, supra note 163, at 525.
172. See Fernando, supra note 160, at 161, 162.
173. The "Amazon Pact," was signed by the foreign ministers of Bolivia, Brazil, Columbia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, Surinam and Venezuela (July 3, 1978), after an unusually short
period of negotiations among the member-states (fifteen months). See Lott, supra note 156
at 1011. For a review of the negotiations leading to the agreement, see, Lott, supra note
156, at 569-571.
174. See Lott, supra note 156, at 570-71.
175. Id. at 1012.
In 1980, as this article was going to press, several developments took place which may
substantially affect the integration movement in Latin America.
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By 1980, the exceedingly slow progress made by LAFT A towards a free trade area
caused such widespread dissatisfaction among the member-states that it was believed impossible to reform LAFT A solely from within. Instead, an entirely new successor organization, the Associacion Latinoamericano de Integracion (LAIA) was created with the goal of
coming into existence by the end of 1980. Given that the nations which signed the Treaty of
Montevideo in August, 1980 would have to renegotiate more than 12,000 national list concessions, 7,000 non-extensive concessions, and 25 complementation pacts, it was not surprising
that the goal of having LAIA's structure in place had fallen behind its timetable. It is now
comtemplated for sometime in 1981.
LAIA's purpose is not to create a customs union or free trade area. It is intended that
the goals of the new organization be less ambitious than those of LAFTA, which may have
failed because its objectives were out of touch with the realities of the individual needs of
the member-states and their economic and social structures. LAIA will create a preferential
treatment area through three mechanisms: Partial Agreements; Differential Treatments;
and Preferential Margins. The first will permit bilateral agreements on selected items,
although the agreements in question will remain open for other member-states' adherence
at a later date, a process described as "convergency." The second will permit agreements
between member-states based upon the classification of the member-states' overall
economic situation. The third will establish general rules for reciprocal treatment among
the member-states.
The CACM integration treaty, which is due to expire in June, 1981, is facing serious
problems because of differences among the member-states over the extent to which the proposed reforms should be carried out. This stems from the differing economic situation in
each of the member-states generally, as well as from the fact that some nations have received greater benefits from the treaty than others.
The following problems within the region, as well as external relations with other nations, have at the end of 1980 left the prospects for CACM after June, 1981 unclear.
a. Following its 1979 revolution, Nicaragua has demanded major changes which
would expand the economic orientation of the convention to include espousal
of the social and political positions of the region.
b. El Salvador supports the major changes proposed in 1976 by CACM's
secretariat, Sieca, which call for major lowering of. barriers to the movement
of people, goods, and capital as well as a significantly closer coordination of
sector policies.
c. Costa Rica, historically with little enthusiasm for regional integration, seeks
little more than reductions in tariffs.
d. Honduras, wishing to return to CACM for the first time since its withdrawal
at the time of the 1969 "soccer war," wants to obtain preferential treatment
because its economic situation is less advanced than its neighbors.
e. Guatemala, the only member which has benefited from the current CACM arrangements, not surprisingly wants no major changes (it has consistently had
trade surpluses within its regional trade).
Problems of a political nature in late 1980 caused deep divisions within ANCOM. Subsequent to the latest Bolivian coup d'etat (July, 1980), ANCOM issues an Andean Code of Conduct declaring the member-states' strong stand for human, political and social rights among
their citizens and openly denouncing the latest Bolivian military regime. A month later,
Bolivian delegates walked out of an ANCOM sectoral meeting, and Colombia refused to invite Bolivian to attend a December meeting of the Andean heads of state on the grounds
that only "legitimately elected heads of state "should attend. No solution to this rift is in
sight, and it is possible that Bolivia will withdraw from ANCOM.
For reports on these matters, see BUSINESS LATIN AMERICA, New Integration Treaty
Revises Ground Rules and Dismantles LAFTA 217 (July 9, 1980); id. at 307 (Sept. 24, 1980);
id. at 329 (Oct. 15, 1980); id. at 379, 381 (Nov. 26, 1980).
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